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1. Introduction 
The share devoted to foreign aid in developed countries’ government budgets is usually small. 
But on the side of the recipient country, aid inflows can be rather large, as a share of government 
revenues and also relative to GDP. Foreign aid thus provides the opportunity for donors to obtain 
a large positive impact on living conditions in developing countries with relatively little financial 
effort. However, whether aid really has a positive and measurable effect on economic growth and 
other development indicators has been intensely debated by economists, with no scientific 
consensus reached so far. Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2014) claim that in the long run aid has 
increased growth, as well as life expectancy and the average years of schooling, while decreasing 
poverty and infant mortality.  Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011) on the other hand show in a 
meta-study of 105 aid-growth studies that on average, and if the publication bias is controlled for, 
no significant effect of foreign aid on economic growth has been found in the literature. They 
further suggest to shift the focus away from aggregate aid measures to more disaggregated ones, 
which is one of the main motivations for this study. More specifically, the present study 
disaggregates total aid flows into its grant and loan components and asks if at the least one of 
them has a significant impact on growth. If both are significant, the question becomes whether 
their effects are significantly different from each other. 
Much like in the case of aid effectiveness in general, the question whether to give foreign 
aid as non-repayable grants or as repayable loans has been the issue of an intense debate. 
However, unlike in the aid-growth debate, the discussion has been driven by political rather than 
economic arguments. From the donor perspective, the decision whether to give aid as grants or 
loans is probably more motivated by political considerations rather than by their relative 
efficiency (Sanford (2002), Nunnenkamp, Thiele, and Wilfer (2005)). Nevertheless, there is a 
strand of literature that assesses the different economic implications of grants and loans with 
respect to different outcomes, which may be substantial. But again, contrary to the general aid 
and growth debate, this literature has remained largely theoretical. Empirical results on the 
differential effects of loan and grant aid in the receiving countries are scarce, perhaps due to the 
various pitfalls and difficulties that arise if one aims to identify them. Identifying a causal effect 
of aggregated aid on growth is already challenging, due to the widely recognized problem of 
endogeneity bias. This has resulted in a large array of studies developing methods to overcome 
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this bias. But if the goal is to empirically identify the impact of disaggregated aid, that is grants 
and loans, separately, the econometric challenges become even greater, due to the additional 
problem of multicollinearity and joint determination. Nevertheless, the theoretical arguments for 
different effects of loans and grants seem strong enough to warrant a comprehensive empirical 
investigation, despite the obvious difficulties lying ahead. 
Hence, the research question addressed in this paper asks about the differential effect of 
two highly correlated and most likely endogenous factors on growth. Even though there are 
reasons to believe that the true effects of grants and loans differ, as the next section will show, 
this difference may be so small that it is practically impossible to detect and economically 
insignificant. However, the failure to detect any significant differential effect in the empirical 
estimation does not mean that it is too small to be detected or even non-existent. It could also be 
due to the problems of multicollinearity and weak instrumentation, especially in the case of 
multiple endogenous regressors. If one endogenous regressor gets insignificant when 
instrumented, it becomes practically impossible to identify whether it is significantly different 
from other regressors, because confidence bands usually overlap. Thus, in light of these 
problems, a second contribution of this study, in addition to trying to answer the research 
question about the growth effects of grants and loans in a satisfactory way, is of a more 
methodological nature. Using the example of aid-growth regressions with multiple endogenous 
regressors, the problems of weak instrumentation and multicollinearity as well as the most 
effective and feasible ways to detect and address them will be discussed. This is especially the 
case for Sections 4 and 5, which aim at analyzing these problems in an applied manner. 
Section 2 gives an overview of the general debate about the effects of aid on growth and the 
related literature, followed by a summary of the theoretical considerations in favor of loans and 
grants, respectively. Section 3 introduces the data and shows a few key summary statistics. In 
Section 4, a detailed explanation of the endogeneity problem in the aid literature and its 
consequences for empirical studies is given. Afterwards, four of the main identification strategies 
developed to deal with this problem are analyzed, with a special focus on their feasibility in the 
context of the specific research question addressed in this paper. Section 5 applies modified 
versions of two of these strategies and tries to identify an effect of aid, disaggregated to grants 
and loans, on growth. Section 6 shows the results of an extensive set of robustness tests that have 
6 
 
been run in order to address some major threats to the validity of the results, and Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Theory and literature 
This chapter briefly discusses how foreign aid can affect GDP growth from a theoretical point of 
view and then gives an overview of the previous empirical studies and their most important 
results (Section 2.1). Due to the vast amount of literature on the topic, this overview remains 
selective in the choice of works and rather short in their treatment. However, some of the most 
influential methodological papers will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4. Section 2.2 then 
reviews the theoretical and empirical contributions that have already been made with regard to 
the specific research question addressed in this paper: “Is there a difference in the effectiveness of 
grant aid and loan aid?”  
2.1 On the heterogeneous effect of foreign aid on growth 
In a standard neoclassical growth model, capital accumulation (i.e. investment) is an important 
determinant of GDP growth. However, especially for less developed countries, investment is 
constrained by the difficult access to external sources of financing, as these countries face 
particularly high borrowing costs on international capital markets. This borrowing constraint can 
lead to savings and investment rates which are too low from an intertemporal point of view, 
holding the growth rate below its optimal level. Foreign aid, whether it comes as a permanent 
transfer (grant) or as a temporal one (concessional loans), can relax the borrowing constraint and 
thus promote growth. However, in the long run this will only happen when at least part of the aid 
transfer is used for productive investment, as opposed to unproductive investment or 
consumption. It is also important that aid is not highly fungible, meaning that it does not just 
crowd out domestically financed investments and in the process lead to reallocation of resources 
to other, less productive government activities. Only if aid finances productive investments and if 
fungibility is low will it help to bring a country closer to its optimal steady state long-run growth 
rate. In other words, the effect of foreign aid on growth is of course conditional on its use, which 
in turn can depend on many factors, such as the specific type of aid (technical assistance, grants, 
loans etc.) or the policy environment in the receiving country. As a result, the effect of aid on 
growth is expected to be heterogenous across recipient countries and over time. 
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This theoretical conjecture has been tested in various ways, resulting in a large body of empirical 
literature.1 The study of Boone (1996) can be seen as the starting point of this “modern” strand of 
literature which considers a possibly heterogenous impact of aid. Boone finds that aid has 
increased neither investment nor different human development indicators, such as infant 
mortality and life expectancy. Furthermore, aid ineffectiveness seems to be independent of the 
political regime. He explains this non-significant impact of aid with the fact that politicians who 
maximize their own welfare use aid mainly to increase consumption instead of financing 
productive investments. These findings are in a way consistent with the much more influential 
results of Burnside and Dollar (2000), who find in their seminal paper that aid has an 
insignificant effect on growth, unless it is combined with good policies.2 In their framework, this 
is shown by interacting a policy index, combining the inflation rate, the budget surplus, and a 
trade openness index, with the aid flow variable. The coefficient of this interaction term turns out 
to be positive and highly significant, which underlines their main conclusion that aid is effective 
only when it is combined with good policies.  
While in the aftermath many scholars used similar empirical strategies to test for the 
conditional effect of aid on growth with respect to many different variables,3 the result of 
Burnside and Dollar has also been criticized by others.  Among the critics are Hansen and Tarp 
(2001), who show that the aid-policy interaction term loses significance if another possible non-
linearity of aid is accounted for. More specific, they add a squared aid variable to the 
specification of Burnside and Dollar, which turns out to have a negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that aid affects growth only with diminishing marginal returns, 
independent of the policy regime.  Easterly (2003) shows that the Burnside and Dollar results are  
very sensitive with respect to alternative definitions of their main variables and he also criticizes 
the way in which the “aid industry” has used these results. In a follow-up, Easterly, Levine, and 
Roodman (2004) show that the Burnside and Dollar results are not robust to an expansion of the 
                                                          
1 A good synthesis on the heterogenous impact of aid on growth is given by Chauvet (forthcoming). 
2 Unlike Burnside and Dollar (2000), Boone (1996) did not look at the effectiveness of aid conditional on actual 
policy outcomes, but rather conditional on the institutional environment („liberal democracy“ versus „repressive 
regime“). 
3 For example, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) find that aid is less effective in the tropics, Djankov, Montalvo, 
and Reynal-Querol (2009) show that aid is less effective when it comes from too many different donors and 
Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) find that aid is more effective in highly centralized economies.  More recently, 
Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring (2014) and Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp (2014) looked at the effect of 
political variables at the donor and donor-recipient levels and found that aid given for political (strategic) reasons is 
less effective.  
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dataset with respect to the country sample and the time frame considered. Guillaumont and 
Chauvet (2001) find that the external and climate environment of an aid receiving country 
matters more for the effectiveness of aid than good policies. Using a novel identification strategy, 
in line with Tavares (2003), Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find no significant impact of aid on 
growth, which leads them to conclude that previous studies have been plagued by endogeneity 
bias. However, Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) show that a slightly improved, but very similar 
instrumentation strategy again confirms a positive and unconditional effect of aid on growth, at 
least over longer time frames. A summary of the often contradictory results on this topic is given 
in the extensive meta-studies of the aid-growth literature by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 
2009, 2011), who conclude that on average, aggregate aid does not lead to more growth. 
However, these studies did not settle the dispute. Using a completely different identification 
strategy based on lagged and differenced data, Clemens et al. (2012) find a positive effect of 
disaggregated aid on growth. They argue that the timing and the distinction between “early-
impact” and “late-impact” aid is crucial if its effectiveness is to be tested empirically. More 
recently, Chauvet and Ehrhart (2014) showed a positive relationship between aid and sales 
growth at the firm level. Using firm level panel data, they argue that aid increases the productive 
capacity by relaxing infrastructure constraints, most importantly related to electricity and 
transport infrastructure.  
Finally and most recently, this time back at the macro level, Galiani et al. (2014) use an 
innovative quasi-experimental approach to identify a large positive impact of aid on growth. But 
due to the specifics of their identification strategy, this result is only obtained by looking at a 
comparatively small and specific sample consisting of 39 countries. Hence, exemplary for the 
recent macro literature on aid and growth, Galiani et al. conclude that “overall foreign aid 
increases economic growth among poor countries”, but that “aid may have heterogeneous effects 
depending on recipient characteristics, aid modalities, and donor motives” while they further note 
that their “relatively small and homogeneous sample is not ideal for testing heterogeneous effects 
of aid” (p.31).  
2.2 Grants versus loans 
Whereas the heterogenous effect of aid on growth with respect to recipient characteristics and 
donor motives has been researched extensively, studies that concentrated on the effect of 
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different aid types and modalities have been scarcer.4 For example, Miquel-Florensa (2007) finds 
that tied aid, which is aid that has to be used for purchasing goods and services from the donor 
country, is less effective than untied aid, at least in countries with good policies. As another form 
of aid modality, much attention has been paid to the concept of conditional aid, which builds on 
the idea that the actual size of aid flows is made ex-ante conditional on the actually realized (ex-
post) performance (Svensson (2003), Scholl (2009)). Finally, donors have to decide whether to 
give aid as non-repayable grants or as concessional loans. From a theoretical point of view, both 
types of aid may have very different effects on growth, which will be discussed in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
2.2.1 Asymmetric information and moral hazard: The case for loans 
Foreign aid donors (single donors as well as multilateral aid agencies) and receiving countries are 
in a classical principal-agent relationship with asymmetric information. The objectives of the 
donor and those of the recipient do not necessarily coincide. The donor (the principal) wants to 
see its aid transfers being used as effectively as possible, at least in the short run, because it is 
accountable to its voters or stakeholders. The direct aid recipient (the agent), which is often the 
government itself or at least controlled by the government, may want to maximize its own 
welfare, for example by using part of the aid money to benefit a small well-connected elite, or by 
using aid partly to buy votes, which are inefficient strategies from an economic point of view. 
These instances of moral hazard can occur, because the agent is better informed of its own 
actions than the principal. It is simply too costly for donors to monitor and control the use of 
every aid dollar in every aid receiving country. As a consequence, if the costs of monitoring and 
the risk of moral hazard behavior are too high, donors will decide to stop giving aid altogether.5 
All these considerations seem to speak in favor of loans and against grant aid, because 
loans arguably provide better incentives in form of harder government budget constraint, leading 
to more tax effort and fiscal responsibility (Bräutigam (2000). Accordingly, Gupta et al. (2003) 
show that grant aid decreases government revenues while loan aid increases them, supporting the 
                                                          
4 Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011) found 103 studies looking at aggregated aid, but only 15 which looked at 
disaggregated aid flows, i.e. aid with different modalities. The result of their meta-regression shows a significant 
positive effect of grant aid, short-term aid and project aid, while technical assistance and multilateral aid are 
insignificant. 
5 If fungibility is high, this can further reinforce moral hazard problems. Even if budget aid itself is used for its 
purpose, it may lead to the diversion of other funds, over which the donor has even less control. 
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hypothesis that grants may be used as substitutes for taxes. Through this channel, grant aid would 
decrease countries’ ability to collect taxes to finance investments in the future, leading to lower 
growth prospects. Cohen, Jacquet, and Reisen (2007) argue that due to the adverse incentives that 
grants can have on fiscal discipline, loans should be kept as an important aid instrument.  
Intuitively, it seems quite obvious that loan aid should be used to finance productive investments, 
because the loans have to be repaid later. However, the degree to which the repayment obligation 
incentivizes governments to use aid flow efficiently depends crucially on the myopic nature of 
political leaders and on the degree of transparency and political accountability in the receiving 
countries. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus grants are more likely to be used for consumption, since 
they carry no repayment obligation. According to the argumentation about aid effectiveness in 
the beginning of Section 2.1, this should tip the balance in favor of loans, which can be expected 
to lead to more growth than grants. However, a precautionary remark should be made here. 
Whether loans are used differently than grants at all depends on many other factors, including the 
typical maturity of the loans. If they are very long-term, if the probability of debt forgiveness is 
deemed high (both can certainly be the case for many development aid loans) or if leaders are 
simply myopic, then loans may not be perceived different from grants at all. In this case, one 
would expect no differential impact on growth. 
2.2.2 Debt crises and defensive lending: The case for grants 
Despite the fact that a reasonable case for loan aid can be made based on the arguments 
mentioned above, the so-called Meltzer Commission report prominently argued for a shift from 
loans to grants and a complete cancellation of poor-country debt.6  Academic backing for this 
proposal comes from Bulow and Rogoff (2005) who argue that “the increased risk of debt crisis 
all too often outweighs any gain ordinary citizens might enjoy from [development] loans” 
(p.393). According to their argument, loan aid allows poor countries’ governments to accumulate 
more debt than what is justified by fundamental growth prospects and more than is supported by 
domestic political consensus. The accumulation of unsustainable debt through aid in the form of 
concessional loans can be even exacerbated by what is called “defensive lending”. This term 
describes the incentive of lenders (i.e. donors) to always roll over debt and allow the recipient to 
                                                          
6 The Meltzer commission was a commission of the US congress with the goal to work out proposals for reforming 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Sanford (2002, 746-752) summarizes the main arguments for 
a shift to grants which have been brought forward in this debate. 
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repay older loans with new loans once the old loans reach their maturity. Defensive lending 
happens irrespectively of whether or not the former loans have actually been used productively, 
because the lender is simply reluctant to take losses on his previous loans. This way, the positive 
incentive effects of concessional loans would be eliminated. However, Cohen Jacquet, and 
Reisen (2007) found no proof that donors actually behave this way. But overall, the possibility of 
loan aid leading to the accumulation of large unsustainable debt in developing countries cannot 
be easily discarded. As high debt levels increase the likelihood of a debt crisis and other 
distortions, it is also likely to result in a negative effect of loan aid on growth in the long run. 7 
2.2.3 Grants versus loans: Does it matter at all? 
The preceding discussion showed that the differential effect of loan aid and grant aid on growth is 
not clear a priori. Neither do we know whether to expect any positive effects at all, nor can we 
say whether the coefficient of grants or loans should be larger. A third hypothesis has been 
brought forward by Nunnenkamp, Thiele, and Wilfers (2005), who argue that it is very unlikely 
that grants and loans have any differential impact at all, because they are simply too much alike 
from the recipients’ point of view. In the end, because the growth effects of loan and grant aid are 
very much ambiguous a priori, the answer to the research question becomes an empirical matter. 
That is the goal for the remainder of this paper. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
With regard to the data, one of the major concerns in studies that estimate growth regressions is 
the choice between cross-sectional and panel data, and the appropriate period length if panel data 
is chosen. This question is still unsettled in the literature, but it seems that the most influential 
growth studies are those relying on cross-sectional instead of panel data (e.g. Barro (1991), 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) versus Islam (1995)). But in the 
subsample of growth studies which look at the effect of foreign aid on economic growth, the 
situation seems to be the other way around, as most scholars prefer to use panel data.8  
                                                          
7 See for example Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who famously argued that growth rates turn negative if external debt 
exceeds 90% of GDP in emerging market economies. 
8 Out of the studies mentioned in Section 2, for example Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), 
Clemens et al. (2012), Chauvet and Ehrhart (2014) and Galiani et al. (2014) rely on panel data. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) and Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) are among those studies who use pure cross-sectional data in 
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Using panel data has many advantages. It increases the number of observations and hence the 
degrees of freedom, which is an important benefit, because cross-sectional studies are naturally 
restrained by the limited number of existing countries. Even more important, panel data makes it 
possible to use panel estimators such as the first differences or the fixed effects estimators, which 
can effectively remove all unobserved time-invariant country specific effects from the estimation, 
reducing the inherent endogeneity bias in aid-growth regressions (see Section 4). 
The use of panel estimators has also various drawbacks. A main concern, especially with 
dynamic panel estimators, is that they introduce an additional, artificial source of endogeneity, 
leading to the so-called Nickel bias (or Dynamic Panel Bias) when initial GDP is controlled for in 
the regressions (see Section 5.2). However, there are several approaches, such as the Anderson-
Hsiao estimator, which have been developed to account for this source of bias. Hence, this paper 
follows the conclusion of Temple (1999, p. 113) and opts for panel data estimation, as this still 
increases the possibility of getting unbiased results and being able to interpret relationships in a 
causal way. Thus, all equations which are estimated in the following sections, are variants of the 
following stylized growth equation: 
GROWTH it = ODA_G it-1 + ODA_L it-1 + LGDPit-1 + Xit + Country i + Period t + ε it           (1) 
The panel dataset covers 158 countries (all countries which are members of the World Bank and 
ever received aid) over a time span from 1960 to 2010 in the full sample. All time-varying 
variables are computed as annualized arithmetic averages over five-year periods, which results in 
a maximum number of 10 periods. However, due to lack of data for many of the controls used in 
the estimation, the actual country and time coverage is considerably lower, as it can be seen in the 
summary statistics table for the set of controls used in the baseline regression (Table 1).  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
their preferred specification. However, especially the earlier studies using panel data did not actually apply panel 
data estimators, thus treating them as a repeated cross-section and estimating them with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). 
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Table 1 – Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
GROWTH 539 2.122534 2.84753 -10.2187 16.58168 
ODA 539 2.838169 3.560056 -.1245178 24.51311 
ODA_G 539 2.582505 3.466089 0 24.46317 
ODA_L 539 .255664 .6276455 -2.39276 3.607764 
LGDP 539 7.429716 1.241326 4.861017 10.96933 
      
INF 539 2.114528 .9355947 -.2614282 7.993991 
DEPTH 539 42.36541 28.75301 6.00598 243.9438 
REVO 539 .2039889 .3857931 0 2.6 
TRADE 539 79.16474 51.56236 9.33312 400.2004 
BUDG 539 -2.369266 4.674645 -41.74083 19.74644 
LEXP 539 4.121849 .1684958 3.371642 4.388924 
GROWTH- GDP growth rate in %, ODA- bilateral aid as % of GDP, ODA_G- bilateral grant aid as % of GDP, 
ODA_L- bilateral net loan aid as % of GDP, LGDP- logarithm of initial GDP per capita, INF- logarithm of 
(1+inflation rate in %), DEPTH- share of broad money M2 over GDP, REVO- number of revolutions, TRADE- 
(imports + exports) over GDP, BUDG- general government budget surplus as % of GDP, LEXP- logarithm of life 
expectancy (at birth) in years 
There are only 539 observations for 115 countries, hence on average between four and five 
observations per country.9 When lagged values and differenced data are considered later, this 
number decreases even further. The control variables used in the baseline specification are 
standard in the growth literature and are almost completely taken from the seminal paper of Rajan 
and Subramanian (2008).10 They are supposed to capture the institutional environment as well as 
the impact of policies and geography on growth. The number of revolutions, REVOit, as well as 
the logarithm of life expectancy at birth, LEXPit, can be seen as proxies for the institutional 
environment, which vary only slightly over time. Both are expected to be negatively correlated 
with growth. Life expectancy could also capture some of the geographical factors that influence a 
country’s growth prospects. The same may be true for the openness variable, TRADEit. Countries 
with favorable geographic conditions, such as access to water and large trading partners nearby, 
                                                          
9 Of those 541 observations, more than half are for low-income and lower-middle income countries, which are 
classified according to the World Bank as countries with an average annual income of less than 4,125 USD. 
However, around 12 % of the observations in the full sample come from high-income non-OECD members with an 
annual income above 12,745 USD.  
10 The only change, other than the elimination of time-invariant variables, is the substitution of the Sachs and Warner 
(1995) openness index by an openness index that measures the trade share, computed as the sum of imports and 
exports divided by GDP. The reason for this change is that it increases the number of observations considerably. 
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should ceteris paribus have a higher trade share and more growth. However, the trade share also 
reflects policy decisions, as do the budget surplus (BUDGit), the ratio of broad money (M2) over 
GDP (DEPTHit), and the inflation rate (INFit). The first three are expected to be positively 
correlated with growth, while the inflation rate should have a negative coefficient. A more 
detailed description of the main variables, their definitions and sources is given in the appendix 
(Table A).  
With regard to the summary statistics in Table 1, the aid variables are perhaps most 
interesting. ODAit denotes the average annualized total bilateral aid flow (grants plus loans) in the 
respective period, as a percentage of the recipient country’s GDP. On average, countries in the 
sample received around 2.8 % of GDP as foreign aid, which is a sizeable amount. It can also be 
seen that the lion’s share of aid was given as grants (ODA_Git, 2.6% of GDP on average) as 
opposed to concessional loans (ODA_Lit, 0.3% of GDP on average), where a concessional loan is 
counted as foreign aid if it has a grant element (on its present discounted value) of at least 25%.11 
Loans in this case are net loans, which means that loan repayments (and debt forgiveness) are 
already deducted from it. All aid data refer to bilateral official development assistance (ODA), 
which is aid given by those OECD countries who are member of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC).  
Because the empirical strategy employed in large parts of the following sections is 
applicable for bilateral aid flows only12, only those are considered in the baseline specifications, 
in order to make the results of the different approaches comparable. Multilateral aid flows are 
thus not included in the aid variables showed here, but are considered in the robustness tests 
(Section 6). Because multilateral aid is excluded, the results can only be interpreted as local 
average treatment effects (LATE). As Deaton (2010) argues, these effects may not be especially 
policy relevant and may not even be meaningful in some cases. Hedging against this objection, it 
should be noted already that the inclusion of multilateral aid flows does not lead to significant 
changes in the estimation results, as it will be further discussed in the robustness test Section 6. 
                                                          
11 Using a reference interest rate of 10%. 
12 Most importantly, imputed aid flows (multilateral aid flows traced back to their original bilateral source), which 
have to be added to the bilateral aid flows in the supply-side instrumentation strategy, are not available on a more 
disaggregated level, which makes this strategy unsuitable for instrumentation of grants and loans. 
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To complete the descriptive statistics section and to provide a starting point for the discussion in 
the next chapter, Table 2 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients between growth and the 
different bilateral aid variables.  
Table 2 – Pairwise correlation between aid and growth 
Variable GROWTH ODA_G ODA_G_2 ODA_L ODA_L_2 
GROWTH 1 
   
 
ODA_G -0.1778* 1 
  
 
ODA_G_2 -0.1357* 0.8837* 1 
 
 
ODA_L -0.0772 0.0612 0.0192 1  
ODA_L_2 -0.1527* 0.1889* 0.0875* 0.7044* 1 
Pairwise correlation, * p<0.05, n= 539, ODA_L_2 - square of ODA_L, ODA_G_2- square of ODA_G 
Consistent with previous studies, the simple correlation between aid and growth is negative and 
significant (on the 5%-level), with a correlation coefficient of -0.18 for grants. The correlation 
between loans and growth is negative as well, but turns out to be statistically insignificant.13 
However, the negative correlation between measures of aid and growth does not mean that aid in 
its various forms reduces growth. Instead, it is most likely the result of endogeneity bias due to 
reverse causality and omitted variables. The next section discusses these sources of bias and 
analyzes the most promising strategies to eliminate it, especially if the goal is to determine the 
differential impact of grants and loans. 
4. Empirical strategy: How to overcome the endogeneity bias? 
4.1 The problem 
The main obstacle that every study of the aid-growth relationship has to overcome is the problem 
of the endogeneity of aid. Usually, the coefficient of foreign aid in a simple cross-country OLS 
growth regression has found to be negative. This does not necessarily mean that aid reduces 
growth. It rather reflects the simultaneity bias and shows that the dominant relationship between 
aid and growth is negative and runs from growth to aid (Roodman 2008). Countries with adverse 
shocks to growth receive more aid, and countries that grow unusually fast receive less aid as a 
                                                          
13 Out of the contemporaneous and squared aid terms, only loans fail to pass the threshold of r>|0.1|, which has 
been proposed by Chatelain and Ralf (2014) to prevent spurious correlation in the presence of “classical 
surpressors.”  However, the simple correlation coefficients for the lagged values are all below that threshold, 
making multicollinearity a serious concern. 
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percentage of GDP.14 This leads to a downward bias of the aid coefficient, which can be very 
substantial. Again, this does not exclude the possibility of a causal relationship from aid to 
growth. But it shows that it is very challenging to uncover this causal effect and obtain significant 
and unbiased, not just spurious results, as it is shown for example by Brückner (2013). The 
research question addressed in this study intensifies this problem, because it essentially asks for 
the causal effect of aid on growth, conditional on the type of aid (as a concessional loan or a 
grant). The relationship between the type of aid and growth is expectedly highly endogenous as 
well, although the sign of the bias could go either way.  
From a theoretical point of view, countries with bad growth performances may receive 
more grant aid (relative to loans) for simple altruistic reasons, i.e. because they are more in need 
of non-repayable funds. From the donor’s point of view, it would also make sense to give loans 
preferably to countries with good expected growth performances, as they are more likely to repay 
their debt in the future. This would both lead to a downward bias of grant aid relative to loan aid. 
However, one could also make the opposite argument, arguing that donors want to reward 
successful reforms in developing countries, preferably with grants, which may lead to an upward 
bias of grant aid. Even though the first strand of arguments (arguing for a downward bias of grant 
aid) is conceived to be theoretically stronger, the direction of the relative bias between grants and 
loans is ultimately an empirical matter.  
The following sections will introduce and critically assess the main strategies that have 
been used to address the endogeneity of aid. Most importantly, it will be analyzed if and how 
these strategies can be used or extended to deal with the case of two endogenous regressors, 
being jointly determined and thus showing a potentially high degree of collinearity. The order in 
which these approaches are presented is somewhat ad-hoc, but one may argue that the 
identification strategies in the beginning are less complex and more efficient, but also more likely 
to give biased results than those considered in the end. 
                                                          
14 This mechanical relationship is obvious, but it also holds true that they receive less aid per capita. 
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4.2 The different strategies to solve the endogeneity issue 
4.2.1 Lags and differences: Clemens et al. (2012) 
In choosing an identification strategy, there is often a tradeoff between robustness and efficiency. 
The most robust instruments are likely to be rather weak, leading to low statistical power. 
Clemens et al. (2012) choose an identification strategy which is simple and efficient, but only 
accounts for a part of the endogeneity problem. They use lagged values of aid as a regressor and 
transform all their data into first differences, which leads to the following equation to be 
estimated: 
          ΔGROWTHit = ΔODAit-1 + ΔODA_2it-1 + ΔLGDPit-1 + ΔXit +Period t + Δεit                 (2) 
Using lagged aid flows as explanatory variables instead of contemporaneous flows has two 
positive effects. First, it accounts for the fact that aid may influence growth with a time lag, for 
example because investments need time until they become profitable. Thus, one would expect aid 
in period t-1 to have an impact on growth only in the next period t. The second effect is that 
lagging aid reduces the probability of simultaneity bias. While the growth performance of a 
recipient country may very well affect its aid inflows in the same period (especially if period 
averages are taken), it is less likely that it affects aid flows in the previous period.15 
First-differencing the data also aims at reducing a part of the endogeneity bias that stems 
from omitted variables, by removing all country-specific time-invariant fixed effects (or 
confounding factors), as it can be seen in equation 2, where the variable Countryi from equation 1  
cancelled out. However, first differencing and using lagged aid-flows are not a complete remedy 
against endogeneity bias. It is still possible that donor A increases its aid to recipient B, because it 
expects a negative growth shock in the next period. On the other hand, one could also imagine a 
case where the donor increases aid to recipient C, because a newly elected reform-oriented 
government will likely lead to a positive growth shock in the next periods. Hence, country-
specific time-varying unobserved heterogeneity would still lead to an endogeneity bias, and the 
direction of the bias is not obvious. For this reason, Clemens et al. (2012) and other authors using 
the same identification strategy (for example Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp (2014)) 
remain very cautious and only interpret their results as a positive correlation between aid and 
                                                          
15 Obviously, this depends on the amount of serial correlation in the error terms. 
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growth, not necessarily a causal relationship.16 However, even this cautious interpretation has 
been recently criticized by Roodman (2013, 2014), who replicates Clemens et al. and clearly lays 
out the strong exogeneity assumptions needed for unbiasedness of their results.17 
4.2.2 Demand-side instruments: Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
A more robust way to account for endogenous regressors than lagging and differencing is the use 
of instrumental variable (IV) estimators such as the two-stages least squares (2SLS) estimator. 
The idea of IV estimation (of which 2SLS and GMM are special cases) is to find one or more 
variables, called instruments, which are correlated with the endogenous regressor but are 
exogenous themselves. In other words, the instruments have to be relevant (highly correlated with 
the endogenous regressor) and valid (orthogonal, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term). They also 
have to satisfy the exclusion restriction, which is to say that they must not directly affect the 
dependent variable (only indirectly through the endogenous regressor), and thus can be left out in 
the final equation. 
In their influential study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) chose instruments at the recipient 
country level, notably the logarithm of its population size, the share of arms imports in total 
imports and several interactions with their policy variable. There are two problems with this 
choice of instruments. The policy variable is very likely to be endogenous to growth, since it 
contains the inflation rate and the budget balance, which are both not orthogonal in a growth 
regression. Thus, policy-related instruments are probably invalid (Tarp and Hansen 2001). 
Furthermore, even though the recipient country’s population size may not directly influence 
growth, using it as an instrument does not necessarily satisfy the exclusion restriction. Bazzi and 
Clemens (2013) show that population size has been used as an instrument for various other 
variables, many of them being possibly related to growth. Unless those variables are all included 
in the growth regression (which would probably lead to an endogeneity bias on its own), the 
population size instrument will be correlated with the error term and thus violate the exclusion 
restriction. Since it has also been shown that the Burnside and Dollar IV strategy relies almost 
                                                          
16 Additionally, to increase the likelihood that they actually do capture some causal effects, Clemens et al. (2012) 
exclude all aid flows that can only expected to have an impact on growth in the long run, thus using only „early-
impact“ aid in their regressions. 
17 Bazzi and Bhavnani (2014) have responded to some of these criticisms. 
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completely on population size as an instrument,18 their IV results are not reliable and very likely 
to be biased. In general, the main problem with their instrumentation strategy is that they pick 
instruments at the recipient country level, which makes them unlikely to be exogenous and to 
satisfy the exclusion restriction. In most cases, recipient level candidate instruments provide 
additional information about a country’s expected growth rate, and excluding them as regressors 
from the second stage inevitably leads to omitted variable bias. Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) 
extend the Burnside and Dollar strategy by adding instruments which should reflect the recipients 
past colonial relationship, for example the population share which has a European first language 
and several colonial relationship dummies. Both can expected to be correlated with aid, and may 
well be uncorrelated with growth. But even though this extension increases the instrumentation 
strength compared to the Burnside and Dollar benchmark, the results would still be biased, as 
long as the original instruments, which are not orthogonal to growth, are kept. 
4.2.3 Supply-side instruments: Rajan and Subramanian (2008) 
The state-of-the-art instrumentation strategy for aid picks instruments at the donor (and donor-
recipient) level and hence models the supply of aid rather than its demand. Since instrumentation 
is mainly influenced by variables in the donor country, it can reasonably assumed to be 
exogenous to growth in the recipient country. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) have been the first 
to introduce this IV strategy, based on earlier work by Tavares (2003). The idea is to model each 
bilateral donor-recipient aid flow in a gravity equation, using colonial dummies and the 
population ratio between the two countries. It is assumed that a donor gives more aid to countries 
to which it has strong historical and cultural ties (represented by colony dummies) and over 
which it has a bigger influence (the population ratio). The predicted bilateral aid flows are 
aggregated over all donor countries and this “zero stage” aggregate is then used as a single 
instrument for aid in the first stage of the usual 2SLS procedure.  
Because the second stage equation has as many excluded instruments as it has endogenous 
regressors and so is just identified, some specification tests such as the Hansen J-test are not 
implementable. Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) show that the IV approach of Rajan and 
Subramanian can be improved in many ways. As in the Burnside and Dollar approach, 
                                                          
18 Clemens et al. (2012) show this by including population size in the second stage regression, which immediately 
leads to a weak instrumentation problem. 
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instrumentation strategy mainly relies on the population ratios (POPd/POPr). Furthermore, Arndt 
et al. argue that donor-specific colonial variables are not orthogonal to growth and thus should be 
excluded. For example, former colonies may have different institutions than other countries, 
which have a direct impact on the country’s growth prospects (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001)). However, another remedy for this problem is to substitute the donor-specific colonial 
dummies by a single colony dummy, leading to prefrred zero stage specification of Arndt et al.: 
ODAdr = COLONYdr + LANGUAGEdr + ln(POPd/POPr) + COLONYdr*ln(POPd/POPr)         (3)     
+ Donord + εdr 
As a further extension on Rajan and Subramanian, Arndt et al. also use different estimators, such 
as the Fuller (1977) modified Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator, 
which shown to be more efficient than 2SLS if instruments are weak (Hahn, Hausman, and 
Kuersteiner (2004)). The supply-side IV approach has been criticized among others by Bazzi and 
Clemens (2013). They show that this identification strategy still relies almost completely on 
population size, similar to the demand-side approach discussed above. If population size is 
included as an instrument on its own, the instrument constructed in the zero stage loses all its 
statistical power.19 A recent contribution of Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring (2014) casts further 
doubt on the supply-side instrumentation strategy of aid. They argue that this strategy only 
instruments the “geopolitically motivated” part of foreign aid, as it is based on donor-recipient 
ties. In their paper, they show that this geopolitically motivated aid is less effective in promoting 
growth than aid given without these motivations. 20 Thus, the supply-side instruments may not 
lead to unbiased IV estimates, because they instrument only a “selected part” of the sample of 
endogenous aid. The resulting coefficients should thus only be interpreted as local average 
treatment effects. While this may be a concern for general aid effectiveness regressions, it is less 
worrisome for the approach considered here, since it is mainly focused on the differential impact 
of grant aid and loan aid. If “geopolitically motivated” aid is as likely to be in the form of grants 
as in the form of loans, the loan-share coefficient will not be affected by this bias. One could 
argue that geopolitically motivated aid is much more likely to be in the form of grants than in the 
form of loans, because grants are more similar to a simple transfer. Thus, the grant aid coefficient 
                                                          
19 This might change once panel data is used and ideology is introduced as an additional instrument. Section 5 shows 
whether this is the case. 
20 Dreher et al. (2010) reach similar conclusions by looking at multilateral aid flows only. 
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would be upward-biased. However, the fact that grant aid might be more politically motivated 
and thus less effective than loan aid can be considered a part of the hypothesis that is tested in 
this paper. Hence, politically motivated aid supply is not a source of bias, but rather a “channel” 
through which grant aid could be more or less efficient than loan aid. The conclusion of Dreher, 
Eichenauer, and Gehring (2014) can be viewed as complementary to rather than competing with 
the analysis in this paper. 
4.2.4 Quasi-experiments : Galiani et al. (2014)  
Finally, the use of quasi-experiments is a different approach to achieve identification and 
estimate causal relationships when endogeneity issues are present. The distinctive feature of a 
quasi-experiment (or natural experiment) is that in most cases it uses just one, clearly exogenous 
binary shock, to identify a treatment effect.21 Because units of observation are observed before 
and after the shock (i.e. the treatment), the treatment basically divides those units into a treated 
and an untreated control group, very similar to actual experiments. But unlike in real experiments 
or in a randomized controlled trial (RCT), which is becoming more and more popular in 
economics, the treatment in quasi-experiments is not completely random. The treated group may 
have unobserved characteristics that make it different from the untreated group, even if no 
treatment would occur. If this is the case, the treatment assignment is endogenous, leading to a 
sample selection bias. 
With regard to the effects of aid, the treatment or shock that is exploited can be either on 
the donors or on recipients of aid. Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen (2009) use large oil price shocks 
as an instrument to identify the effect of foreign aid given from rich Arab countries to poorer 
Muslim countries. They find no significant impact of aid on growth, but a strong positive effect 
on consumption and imports. Nunn and Qian (2014) show that US food aid, instrumented by 
shocks to US wheat production, increased the incidence, onset, and duration of civil war in the 
receiving countries. 
The recent study of Galiani et al. (2014) uses a quasi-experimental approach with treatment 
at the recipient level to identify the effect of aid on growth. The natural experiment they employ 
                                                          
21 Estimation methods using a quasi-experimental approach are, for example, Differences-in-Differences, Regression 
Discontinuity Design or Propensity Score matching. Instrumental variables estimation can also be used as a quasi-
experiment, as it will be shown below. 
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as an instrument for aid is the crossing of the income threshold which is used by the International 
Development Association (IDA) to determine whether a country is eligible for aid.  Once the per 
capita income of a receiving country is above this threshold, IDA aid flows are considerably 
reduced. Other multilateral aid agencies as well as bilateral donors use the IDA threshold as a 
signal for their own aid allocation as well. Thus, even though aid from IDA accounts on average 
for less than 10% of total aid, the crossing of the IDA threshold from below reduces aid inflows 
by a much larger percentage, due to the herding in aid allocation of donors. In the sample of 
Galiani et al. (2014) which includes 35 countries and the time from 1987-2009, aid decreased by 
a total of 59% after the threshold was crossed. A dummy which equals 1 when the recipient 
country’s per capita income is above the threshold and 0 otherwise should thus be strongly 
negatively correlated with aid inflows into the same country. Because of that, the “crossing” 
dummy is a candidate instrument for aid in the first stage of a 2SLS regression of growth on aid. 
In this case, one can speak of a quasi-experimental approach, because the IDA threshold, which 
is the cutoff that determines whether a country receives the treatment or not, is not chosen by the 
researcher or the country itself, and it is also not dependent on individual country characteristics. 
Instead, it is set exogenously by the World Bank (of which IDA is a member) and it is the same 
for all countries and over time, except for a yearly inflation adjustment.  
However, the fact that the cutoff threshold is determined exogenously does not mean that 
the crossing of this cutoff is exogenous as well. If the crossing dummy is correlated with the error 
term in the growth regression, the results will be biased. This may for example be the case if a 
country crosses the threshold due to a few successive positive growth shocks, after which it will 
experience negative shocks that bring it back to its balanced growth path. In this case, the 
reduction of growth rates after the crossing will be falsely attributed to the reduction in aid, even 
though it only represents a usual reversion to the growth trend. Galiani et al. (2014) address this 
threat to their identification strategy in various ways. Most importantly, they develop a separate 
growth model and use it to predict the time of the IDA threshold crossing. By using the predicted 
rather than the actual crossing as an instrument for aid, they ensure that the instrument is not 
correlated with growth shocks and is thus completely exogenous. With this innovative and 
convincing approach, Galiani et al. (2014) find a comparatively large, significant, and robust 
positive effect of aid on growth. They further show evidence suggesting that aid increases growth 
via investment, at least in the short run. However, due to their quasi-experimental approach, they 
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can only include countries that have crossed the IDA threshold from below since 1987, leaving 
them with a rather homogenous sample of 35 countries. This homogeneity of the sample together 
with the relatively low number of countries make this approach not ideal for the purpose of this 
paper. But most importantly, since IDA gives both loans and grants, the crossing of the IDA 
threshold cannot be used to identify their differential effect on growth. 
5. Results 
The following section compares the results of several estimation strategies discussed in the 
previous chapter. To provide a starting point, the model is first estimated as a random effects 
panel estimator, which does not eliminate country-specific unobserved effects (Section 5.1). 
Those effects are subsequently eliminated by estimation in first differences (Section 5.2), 
following Clemens et al. (2012). Finally, a supply-side estimation strategy, in the tradition of 
Tavares (2003) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008), is implemented in an attempt to eliminate 
any remaining endogeneity bias (Section 5.3). Additional instrumentation and estimation 
strategies are then considered as robustness test, in Section 6.   
5.1 Random effects  
Table 3 shows the results of estimation of equation 1 (see Section 3) with the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator, thus assuming the Random effects model to be 
valid. As in all of the following estimations, a variance-covariance matrix which is robust to 
clustering at the country level is used. Period dummies are employed as well to capture period-
specific shocks. Outliers are always identified and excluded according to the BACON algorithm 
introduced by Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000) (see also Weber (2010)). Until noted otherwise, 
the disaggregated aid variables (loans and grants) and later also their squared values are lagged 
by one period, to allow the aid flows to “work” and financed investments to materialize returns. 
Column 1 shows the results when loan aid and grant aid are simultaneously introduced into the 
growth regression, which implicitly assumes that they have a linear marginal effect on growth. 
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Table 3 – Random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
ESTIMATOR RE RE RE RE RE FE 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
              
L.ODA_L 0.270** 0.246** 0.257 0.075 0.139 0.175 
 
(0.136) (0.115) (0.213) (0.126) (0.109) (0.130) 
L.ODA_L_2 
 
-0.041* -0.046 -0.064** -0.035 -0.034 
  
(0.023) (0.079) (0.029) (0.024) (0.033) 
L.ODA_G 0.123*** 0.337*** 0.246** 0.322** 0.095 0.671*** 
 
(0.044) (0.116) (0.114) (0.143) (0.111) (0.144) 
L.ODA_G_2 
 
-0.012** -0.007 -0.013** -0.004 -0.025*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
LGDP -0.131 0.040 0.322 -0.169 
 
0.820 
 
(0.233) (0.263) (0.311) (0.260) 
 
(0.567) 
L.LGDP 
    
-1.227***  
     
(0.255)  
      
 
Observations 539 539 296 329 539 539 
Controls X X X X† X X 
Period dummies X X X X X X 
R-squared 0.268 0.260 0.337 0.407 0.280 0.349 
Number of countries 115 115 63 64 115 115 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; X†- time invariant controls added 
(geography, ethnic fractionalization, ICRG institution index, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia dummies); FE- 
Fixed effects; RE- Random effects; L- value lagged by one period 
 
Both coefficients are positive and statistically significant. A one percentage point increase of loan 
aid is associated with a 0.27 percentage point increase in the growth rate. For grants, the 
respective increase equals 0.123 percentage points. The size of both coefficients is close to the 
typical marginal effect for aggregated aid that can be found in the literature.22 The linear marginal 
effect of loans seems to be considerably higher than the effect of grants. However, the Wald test 
for the equality of coefficients cannot reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are in fact equal 
(p-value = 0.42). Furthermore, the results in Column 1 are most likely biased. A linear 
specification of both aid variables may lead to a misspecification bias, if their true effect on 
growth shows diminishing returns, as it is often found in the literature (see for example Hansen 
and Tarp, 2001). Hence, in Column 2 I introduce the squared values of loans and grants to 
account for this possibility.  The fact that both squared terms have negative and significant 
                                                          
22 Clemens et al. (2012) find a marginal effect (at the sample average) between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points, 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) find approximately 0.1 percentage points with OLS, but a much larger effect with GMM (up 
to 1 percentage point). Galiani et al. (2014), who only consider a log-linear effect of aid on growth, find an increase 
of around 0.35 percentage points. Finally, Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2014) find an effect ranging between 0.13 and 
0.25 percentage points. 
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coefficients confirms the expectation that both types of aid seem to work with decreasing 
marginal returns. Again, both linear terms are positive and highly significant. But similarly to 
Column 1, the coefficients are not significantly different from each other (Wald test p-value = 
0.56). The turning point, after which the effect of aid on growth becomes negative, is only around 
3 percent of GDP for loan aid, which seems rather small. However, there are only 2 observations 
in the sample which show a higher average share of loans over GDP, annualized over a five-year 
period. For grants, the turning point is at 13 percent of GDP. Only 5 percent of the sample 
observations are above that threshold. 
As in Column 1, the overall fit of the model in Column 2, most of the control variables are 
significant and all but have the expected signs (not shown). Column 3 restricts the sample to 
countries in the low-income and lower-middle-income group, according to the World Bank. It 
could be expected that aid works particularly well in these countries, since they face the strongest 
constraints to external financing sources, which aid could relieve. On the other hand, as they may 
lack sufficient financial institutions and absorption capacity, loan aid should work considerably 
less well than grants. Only the second of these assertions is illustrated in Column 3. The 
coefficients of loans and grants are both lower than with the full country sample, but only grant 
aid remains statistically significant.  
The baseline specification contains only a time-varying set of control variables, because 
time-invariant regressors have to be omitted in the later steps, when the data are first-differenced. 
But up to this point, the random effects model allows the estimation of time-varying as well as 
time-invariant regressor. Thus, Column 4 adds an additional set of standard time-invariant 
controls, taken from Rajan and Subramanian (2008), to the baseline set of controls. The 
coefficients of grant aid and squared grant aid in Column 4 remain close to those in Column 2. 
The coefficient of loans, however, becomes insignificant, once time-invariant regressors are 
introduced. 
This first, simple analysis seems to suggest that grants work better than loans, even though 
both types of aid have a tendency to be positively related to growth. But there are two main 
threats to the naïve identification strategy employed in this section. First of all, donor countries 
may jointly determine the amount of loans and grants that they give in a certain year, which 
would lead to a high correlation between loan aid and grant aid. Even more important, the aid 
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variables are highly correlated with their squared terms, relative to their correlation with growth 
(see Table 2).  Chatelain and Ralf (2014) show that this multicollinearity problem, originating in 
the “suppressor variables” (i.e. the squared terms), can lead to a situation where identification of 
the true parameters becomes theoretically impossible. One way to detect multicollinearity is by 
calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the suspicious regressors. As a rule of thumb, 
VIFs larger than 10 indicate a severe multicollinearity problem (see for example Wooldridge 
2013, p. 98). For the baseline regression of Column 2, this time estimated with OLS instead of 
random effects, none of the variables has such a high VIF. However, values between 7 and 9 for 
grants and squared grants indicate that multicollinearity may still be a problem to a certain 
degree. As an additional test, the so-called condition number is computed. Greene (2012, p.130) 
regards values higher than 20 as indicative of a multicollinearity problem, while Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005, p.350) set the threshold at 100. For the current specification, the condition number 
equals 6.4 and thus indicates no severe multicollinearity problem. However, following the 
suggestion of Chatelain and Ralf (2014), after which the suspicious “surpressors” may be 
dropped, I estimate most of the following specifications twice, with and without squared aid 
terms. 
Another potential problem with the simple random effects model arises if unobserved 
country specific effect are present. The model assumes that those effects (captured by Countryi in 
equation 1, Section 3) are purely random, i.e. completely uncorrelated with the error term ε it. 
However, in most cases this will not be the case, even with an extensive set of control variables. 
If there are unobserved effects which are correlated with the error term, the parameter estimates 
of the random effects model (estimated with FGLS) are biased (see Section 4.1). Hence, column 
6 re-estimates the specification of column 2 on the within-transformed data, which eliminates 
part of the country-specific effects. A Hausman test shows that the models of columns 2 and 6 are 
significantly different from each other (at the 1%-level), implying that the Random effects 
estimates are inconsistent. Hence, the next section will use first-differenced data, which also 
removes the country-specific effects and thus tends to reduce the bias relative to the random 
effects model. 
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5.2 First-difference estimator 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation in first differences, following Clemens et al. (2012). 
Compared to the random effects panel data model, first-differencing has the advantage that it 
eliminates all unobserved (and observed), time invariant country-specific effects, reducing a 
possible endogeneity bias (see Section 4.2.1). The columns in Table 4 are organized similar to the 
first three columns in Table 3. First a linear effect of aid is assumed, then squared terms are 
introduced, and finally the sample is restricted to low-income countries.  
The first three columns re-estimate the model of Table 3, now using first-differenced data. 
The coefficients of loans and grants show a similar pattern as before, although they are much 
larger now (comparable to the fixed effects version in Table 3, col. 6). Both are significant and 
positive in the linear specification, and loans seem more effective than grants. When quadratic 
terms are introduced, the grant coefficient becomes much larger, although both remain positive 
and significant. In this case, we can also determine that the coefficients of loans and grants are 
significantly different from each other (the Wald test returns a p-value of 0.0102). The turning 
point for aid is similar to the one found in Table 3, Column 2. Once the country sample is 
restricted, loans become insignificant. The controls have the expected sign (not shown), with one 
exception. The initial logarithm of GDP (in its first difference) is highly significant and positive 
in Columns 1 to 3. From a theoretical point of view, this seems counterintuitive, as it is usually 
thought of capturing convergence effects. But since the first difference of logarithmic initial GDP 
is simply the growth rate in period t-1, LGDPit-1 is now a lagged dependent variable and its 
positive coefficient shows that growth rates are positively serially correlated. Unfortunately, the 
introduction of a lagged dependent variable, leads to the error term being correlated with the 
dependent variable.23 The whole estimation becomes inconsistent, and all parameter estimates are 
potentially biased. This so-called Dynamic Panel or Nickell (1981) bias converges to zero if the 
number of periods goes to infinity. Hence, it is in particular a problem in relatively short panels. 
 
 
                                                          
23 This becomes obvious by looking at equation 2 and noting that ΔLGDPit-1 = GROWTHit-1. This lagged dependent 
variable is of course correlated with εit-1, and because this error term is a part of Δεit , ΔLGDPit-1 is endogenous in 
equation 2.  
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Table 4a – First difference estimator 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ESTIMATOR FD FD FD FD FD FD 
VARIABLES D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH 
              
LD.ODA_L 0.425** 0.346** 0.292 0.404** 0.312** 0.346* 
 
(0.179) (0.164) (0.199) (0.167) (0.155) (0.202) 
LD.ODA_L_2 
 
0.025 0.090 
 
0.048 0.080 
  
(0.040) (0.076) 
 
(0.035) (0.081) 
LD.ODA_G 0.232*** 0.711*** 0.521*** 0.181** 0.536*** 0.431** 
 
(0.079) (0.161) (0.187) (0.070) (0.159) (0.186) 
LD.ODA_G_2 
 
-0.026*** -0.017** 
 
-0.020*** -0.015** 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
D.LGDP 2.918*** 3.327*** 3.064*** 
   
 
(0.638) (0.643) (0.696) 
   LGDP 
   
-0.206*** -0.156** -0.154 
    
(0.058) (0.060) (0.103) 
       Observations 406 406 221 406 406 221 
Controls X X X X X X 
Period dummies X X X X X X 
R-squared 0.226 0.254 0.312 0.207 0.224 0.289 
Number of countries 97 97 54 97 97 54 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FD- First difference estimator; L- value 
lagged by one period; D- value in first difference 
There are different ways of addressing the Nickell bias. One naïve possibility would be to include 
only the level of LGDPit-1, not its first difference, which has been done in Columns 4 to 6. The 
coefficient of LGDPit-1 (in its level) now has the “right” negative sign and is significant in two 
out of three cases, while the aid variables are surprisingly robust to this specification change. 
However, the estimates can still not be expected to be unbiased, because the level of LGDPit is 
obviously correlated with the differenced error term as well. Introducing the lagged difference of 
LGDPit-1 in Columns 7 to 9, as a proxy for the endogenous first difference, does also not 
eliminate the bias completely. LGDPit-1 is still contained in the lagged difference, and is 
correlated with the error term εit-1, contained in Δεit. Furthermore, almost all of the aid variables 
become insignificant.  
If instead the twice-lagged difference is used as a control, the aid regressors gain their 
significance again (Table 4b, Columns 10 to 12). This may be because the twice-lagged 
difference of LGDPit-1 is not correlated with the error term anymore, hence the dynamic panel 
bias is completely eliminated. But it may also be because the twice-lagged difference is itself 
only marginally significant, and not a good proxy of the current (“un-lagged”) first difference. 
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Table 4b – First difference estimator 
  (7) (9) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ESTIMATOR FD FD FD FD FD FD 
VARIABLES D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH 
  
  
        
LD.ODA_L 0.158 0.159 0.280* 0.385** 0.252 0.406* 
 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.165) (0.182) (0.194) (0.220) 
LD.ODA_L_2 0.036 0.036 0.032 
 
0.068 0.027 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.081) 
 
(0.082) (0.113) 
LD.ODA_G -0.002 -0.002 0.095 0.153* 0.485** 0.540** 
 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.140) (0.078) (0.193) (0.216) 
LD.ODA_G_2 0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.017** -0.018** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
LD.LGDP -8.680*** -8.733*** -7.988*** 
   
 
(0.748) (0.764) (1.498) 
   L2D.LGDP 
   
-1.065 -0.847 0.141 
    
(0.649) (0.701) (0.655) 
       Observations 406 406 221 378 378 209 
Controls X X X X X X 
Period dummies X X X X X X 
R-squared 0.472 0.474 0.467 0.208 0.222 0.305 
Number of countries 97 97 54 97 97 54 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FD- First difference estimator; L- value lagged by one 
period; L2- value lagged by two periods; D- value in first difference 
 
Hence, one could alternatively consider dropping the LGDPit-1 variable completely, which is done 
in Table 4c, Column 13. In this case, we may trade the Nickell bias for an omitted variable bias. 
However, the results when LGDPit-1 is excluded are very much in line with earlier ones regarding 
the aid variables. Finally, notwithstanding the previous, rather ad-hoc efforts of coping with the 
Nickell bias, the standard approach is to apply the Anderson-Hsiao (1982) estimator, which uses 
lagged levels of the dependent variable or twice-lagged differences as excluded instruments for 
the lagged difference. This approach is considered in columns 14 to 17, which apply Anderson-
Hsiao using the Two Stages least Squares (2SLS) estimator. 
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Table 4c  
 First differences and Anderson-Hsiao IV 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
ESTIMATOR FD AH AH AH AH 
VARIABLES D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH D.GROWTH 
            
LD.ODA_L 0.303* 0.021 -0.257 0.142 -0.090 
 
(0.156) (0.438) (0.443) (0.362) (0.505) 
LD.ODA_L_2 0.047  0.335** 
 
0.249 
 
(0.036)  (0.147) 
 
(0.204) 
LD.ODA_G 0.588*** -0.214 -1.002 -0.080 -0.528 
 
(0.157) (0.215) (0.632) (0.207) (1.077) 
LD.ODA_G_2 -0.022***  0.030 
 
0.015 
 
(0.006)  (0.021) 
 
(0.036) 
 
  
   Observations 406 406 406 406 406 
Controls X X X X X 
Period dummies X X X X X 
R-squared 0.219 - - - - 
Cragg-Donald F-stat - 23.750 17.901 2.439 1.230 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat - 8.495 6.708 1.760 0.899 
KP LM Stat (p-value) - 0.002 0.006 0.199 0.350 
Number of countries 97 97 97 97 97 
Instrumentation of 
D.LGDP 
excluded 
Lagged 
 difference 
Lagged 
 difference 
Lagged level Lagged level 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FD- First difference estimator; AH- 
Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator, L- value lagged by one period; D- value in first difference;  
The results are rather disappointing, as all of the aid variables become insignificant, irrespective 
of the instrument that is used. However, this failure of the Anderson-Hsiao estimators to return 
significant results is not specific to the present study, but also shows itself in the original 
specification of Clemens et al. (2012). Once they account for the dynamic panel bias due to the 
endogeneity of LGDPit-1, their positive results vanish.
24
  However, there are more efficient, but 
also more complex GMM estimators which are more suitable for estimating dynamic panel data 
models, because they can consider further lags and differences as instruments. They will be used 
in the robustness tests in Section 6. 
                                                          
24 Understandably they do not further discuss this apparent failure of their identification strategy. I re-estimated 
Columns 14-17 with aggregated aid and its square term (instead of disaggregated aid), and was still not able to 
obtain significant results, which illustrates that a large part of the positive effect they find may be due to the Nickel 
bias.  
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5.3 Supply-side instrumentation strategy 
Table 5 shows the results when loans and grants are instrumented with a “supply-side” IV 
strategy, in the spirit of Tavares (2003) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). The different 
columns show different specifications for the zero stage as well as different approaches to deal 
with the dynamic panel bias, as all estimations are made with the fixed effects panel IV estimator 
(2SLS). Using the fixed effects estimator in the second stage is a major difference compared to 
previous studies, and it should strengthen the instrumentation strategy, because it eliminates 
unobserved country-specific effects.  
The “zero” stage  
The specification of the zero stage, which uses exogenous bilateral variables to predict loans and 
grants at the donor-recipient level, is particularly important (see Section 4.3). In my preferred 
specification, grants and loans are predicted by dummies indicating a colonial relationship or a 
common language, the logarithm of the population ratio between donor and recipient and an 
interaction of the colony dummy with this ratio. The set of predictors in the zero stage thus 
resembles the one used by Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010).  However, in my case, there is another 
crucial point with regard to the zero stage specification. Because two different aid aggregates 
have to be predicted (grants and loans), it is important to add an additional predictor to the right-
hand side of equation 3, which has a significantly different effect on loans than on grants with 
regard to the donor’s choice between these two forms of aid. In a recent contribution, Brech and 
Potrafke (2014) found a partisan effect on the decision whether to give aid as loans or as grants. 
More specifically, their results show that left-wing governments tend to give more grant aid than 
right wing governments, and that this effect is strongest for bilateral aid to low and lower-middle 
income countries. Because they do not find a significant partisan effect with respect to loan aid 
and total aid, government ideology seems to be a promising instrument that could capture the 
donor’s decision between grants and loans. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that donor 
ideology is exogenous to growth shocks and other idiosyncratic shocks that could influence the 
recipient’s growth rate.  
The instruments from the zero stage are obtained by regressing the bilateral disaggregated 
aid flows for each donor on all recipients over all periods. The resulting coefficients are then used 
to predict each donor’s “aid flow vector”, which contains the predictions of aid flows from this 
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particular donor to each recipient in each period (as a share of the recipients GDP).25 These 
vectors are then aggregated over all donors, to obtain a single predicted share of aid over GDP for 
every recipient-year combination. The whole process is done once for grants and once for loans, 
which delivers two predicted values (ODA0_Git and ODA0_Lit) that can then be used as excluded 
instruments in the first stage of the 2SLS estimation. With regard to the strength of the zero stage 
regressions, the significance of the different predictors is very heterogenous across donors, but 
the overall fit of the regressions seems reasonably good. The new ideology index is significant at 
least at the 5% level in 8 out of 10 cases, if just the 5 major donors are regarded. If left-wing 
donors give more grants than loans, the coefficient of the ideology index should be larger for 
grants than for loans.26 Thus, including ideology may increase the chances of finding a significant 
difference between grants and loans in an instrumental variables approach.  
Second stage results 
Table 5 shows the results obtained by following the supply side IV strategy outlined above. 
Column 1, which uses OLS excludes ideology in the zero stage, shows a significantly positive 
coefficient for grant aid, while loan aid is not significant.27 The grant coefficient is very large, 
about 3 times as large as those found with other identification strategies. However, it is 
significant at the 5% level. Column 2 presents the results when the random effects panel 
estimator is used in the zero stage. The coefficients hardly change, and grant aid remains 
significant. Table 5a provides several measures that are commonly used as specification tests in 
an IV estimation. Most importantly, they should help to assess whether there is a “weak-
instrumentation” problem, which would bias the IV results towards their OLS counterparts (see 
e.g. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), Cameron and Trivedi (2009, pp.194), Greene (2012, 
pp.289)). One way to check for weak instrumentation is to look at the joint significance of the 
excluded instruments in the first stage regression(s). As a rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and 
Stock (1997), a first stage F-statistic below 10 indicates a weak instruments problem. However, 
in the case of more than one endogenous regressor, the Angrist and Pischke (AP) first stage F-
statistic should be looked at instead (Angrist and Pischke (2009), pp. 217-18). For the loan 
                                                          
25 Here the approach differs substantially from Rajan and Subramanian (2008), which do not regress by donor, but by 
period. 
26 The ideology index is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI, see Beck et al. 2001). It takes the 
value 1 if the Chief executive country is classified as right-wing, 2 if it is centrist and 3 if it is left-wing. 
27 Similar to Rajan and Subramanian ((2008), part IV), I start by considering contemporaneous instead of lagged aid 
flows, contrary to the other estimations so far. However, the results with lagged aid flows are shown in Table 5b.  
33 
 
equation, this statistic equals 7.10 in Column 1 (and 6.70 in the Random effects specification in 
Column 2), while it is considerably larger for the grant equation. This comparison shows, that 
there may be a weak instrumentation problem for loans. It also shows that it is not clear whether 
the OLS or the Random effects zero stage specification lead to stronger instrumentation. Another 
specification test uses the Cragg-Donald F statistic, which is below 2 in both columns, and 
decreases slightly when random effects are used in the zero stage.  However, the Cragg-Donald F 
statistic is only valid when the error terms are i.i.d. no robust standard errors are used (see 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and Kleibergen and Schaffer (2007)).  
Table 5a – Supply side panel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ESTIMATOR PANEL IV PANEL-IV PANEL IV PANEL IV PANEL IV PANEL IV 
VARIABLES GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
              
ODA_L 2.463 2.504 2.385 2.517 
  
 
(1.853) (1.985) (1.873) (2.020) 
  ODA_G 0.889** 0.892*** 0.881** 0.905*** 
  
 
(0.349) (0.339) 2.385 2.517 
  LGDP 1.900 1.913 1.874 1.943 0.845 0.910 
 
(1.270) (1.278) (1.263) (1.297) (0.972) (1.018) 
L.ODA_L 
    
0.393 0.412 
     
(0.994) (1.096) 
L.ODA_G 
    
0.361 0.380 
     
(0.233) (0.248) 
       Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517 
Controls X X X X X X 
Period dummies X X X X X X 
R-squared -0.438 -0.453 -0.411 -0.467 0.328 0.325 
Number of country 96 96 96 96 96 96 
AP F-stat: Loans 7.10 6.70 7.12 6.67 11.06 10.00 
AP F-stat: Grants 13.93 15.72 14.34 14.77 15.60 16.18 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 1.398 1.375 1.411 1.361 3.884 3.266 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 9.943 11.227 10.231 10.922 8.765 6.428 
KP LM Stat (p-value) 0.322 0.298 0.322 0.302 0.048 0.023 
First stage: OLS RE     
ODA_L ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 
ODA_G ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 
LGDP - - - - - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;, L- value lagged by one period; ODA_L0 – 
excluded instrument for loans predicted in the zero stage; ODA_G0 – excluded instrument for grants predicted in the 
zero stage 
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For the case of robust standard errors, the Kleibergen-Paap rank test has been proposed, leading 
to the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic.28 According to this statistic, which increases from 9.9 to 11.2, 
instrumentation has become stronger with the switch from OLS to Random effects. However, a 
more formal test of weak instrumentation cannot be made, because the critical values computed 
by Stock and Yogo (2005) were only based on the Cragg-Donald F statistic. A main result of 
Columns 1 and 2 is that the choice of the zero stage estimator (OLS or Random effects) does not 
seem to matter too much. 
In Columns 3 and 4, the ideology variable is included in the zero stage regressions. The 
coefficients of most variables hardly change in both the OLS and the Random effects zero stage 
specification. The introduction of ideology has also just a minor effect on the several 
specification measures, the general direction of which seems unclear. Hence, the ideology 
predictor does not seem to have a strong influence on grants, loans, and their difference, at least 
according to the present specification. However, because it is theoretically attractive and there are 
no obvious disadvantages of including it (and the results with ideology are in fact slightly better 
than without in most of the following specifications), the ideology variable will be retained in the 
zero stage for the following specifications. 
Another specification choice that had been implicitly made so far is the use of 
contemporaneous instead of lagged aid values as regressors, following Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008, Section IV). Because both aid and growth are measured as period averages and the 
optimal period length in growth regressions is still a topic of debate, this choice is not 
theoretically indefensible.29 Columns 5 and 6 show the results when lagged aid flows are used 
instead of contemporaneous flows. The coefficients of both loan aid and grant aid are now 
considerably smaller than before, and have a roughly similar size. They are statistically 
insignificant at conventional significance levels, even though this is only marginally the case for 
grant aid (p-values of 0.122 and 0.125 respectively). A look at the specification tests such as the 
AP F-statistic shows that the first stage seems to provide a significantly better fit now than 
before, especially for loans. The Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic, which tests 
                                                          
28 A disadvantage of the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is that it cannot be compared with the critical values for weak 
instruments derived by Stock and Yogo (2005), which are based on the Cragg-Donald F statistic.  
29 For example, an aid shock in the first year of a period could have a stronger effect on growth the following 4 years 
than it has in the next period (from year 6 to 10). As a matter of fact, switching from contemporaneous to lagged aid 
makes it just more likely to capture the long-term effect, but less likely to capture the short term effect of aid on 
growth. 
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the null hypothesis of underidentification, i.e. that the instruments are relevant enough to identify 
the endogenous regressor, lets us reject this hypothesis at the 5% significance level. Hence, 
contrary to the specifications with contemporaneous aid, the model now seems to be identified. 
This leads to two possible interpretations. Firstly, because the “improved” specification delivers 
insignificant results, one could argue that there is no “true” effect of both loans and grants on 
growth.  
Table 5b – Supply side panel IV 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ESTIMATOR PANEL IV PANEL IV PANEL IV PANEL-IV PANEL IV 
VARIABLES GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
      
L.ODA_L 
  
0.146 0.508 
 
 
  
(2.588) (2.585) 
 
L.ODA_G 
  
0.770 0.640 
 
 
  
(0.506) (0.404) 
 
L.log_ODA_L 0.428 
   
0.116 
 
(0.935) 
   
(2.318) 
L.log_ODA_G 0.365* 
   
0.725 
 
(0.220) 
   
(0.480) 
log_ODA_L 
 
2.209 
   
 
 
(1.772) 
   
log_ODA_G 
 
0.875*** 
   
 
 
(0.323) 
   
LGDP 0.008 0.018 -2.254 -2.892 -0.028 
 (0.009) (0.012) (2.558) (2.312) (0.024) 
      Observations 517 517 514 484 514 
Controls X X X X X 
Period dummies X X X X X 
R-squared 0.334 -0.275 0.013 0.074 0.075 
Number of country 96 96 96 92 96 
AP F-stat: Loans 8.90 8.35 9.31 5.05 7.43 
AP F-stat: Grants 13.23 15.51 19.96 12.31 17.35 
AP F-stat: log(GDP) - - 72.08 32.93 78.58 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 4.075 1.489 2.830 2.196 2.798 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 6.542 11.228 3.945 2.395 2.723 
KP LM Stat (p-value) 0.018 0.318 0.017 0.019 0.004 
First stage: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
ODA_L ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 ODA_L0 
ODA_G ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 ODA_G0 
LGDP - - L.LGDP L2.LGDP L.LGDP 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; L- value lagged by one period; L2- value 
lagged by two periods; ODA_L0 – excluded instrument for loans predicted in the zero stage; ODA_G0 – excluded 
instrument for grants predicted in the zero stage 
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But secondly, one could also argue that this specification simply does not capture the rather short 
term positive effect of aid on growth, while it is more likely to capture the rather long-term 
positive effect of loans. Table 5b addresses two other possible sources of misspecification in the 
supply side IV approach: the possibility of decreasing marginal returns to aid and the dynamic 
panel bias due to the inclusion of LGDPit-1.
30 Columns 7 and 8 account for decreasing returns of 
both grants and loans (in lagged and contemporaneous form), as they have been found in the 
previous section. For this purpose, grants (loans) are now measured as the logarithm of one plus 
the ratio of grants (loans) over GDP. This monotonic transformation is less flexible than 
introducing squared terms, as it cannot account for increasing returns, but it allows us to account 
for diminishing returns without having to introduce two more endogenous regressors (see Galiani 
et al. 2014). The logarithm of grant aid is significant at the 5%-level in the contemporaneous, and 
this time also slightly significant when lagged values are considered. Loans however remain 
insignificant. Most of the specification tests point to a strengthening of the instrumentation 
strategy compared to previous specifications, once logs are considered.  
Columns 9 to 12 address the dynamic panel bias, similarly to the previous section, by 
instrumenting the contemporaneous logarithm of GDP with its lagged values, thus implementing 
the Anderson-Hsiao estimator. In Column 9, the first lag is used for both LGDPit-1 and the aid 
variables. According to the first stage F-statistics, instrumentation remains strong, but the aid 
coefficients turn out to be insignificant again (p-value of 0.128 for grants). Using the second lag 
of LGDPit-1 for instrumentation (Col. 10) and considering again logarithmic transformations (Col. 
11) does not lead to significant estimates. Summing up this section, it can be said that a slight 
majority of the specifications showed a marginally significant positive impact of grant aid on 
growth However, it was not possible to identify whether the effect is significantly different than 
the effect of loans, because the effect of loans could not be instrumented in a sufficient way. In 
general, it became apparent that correction for the Dynamic panel bias seems to be a major issue 
that drives standard error upwards and thus reduces significance.  
5.4 Summary of the main results 
Table 6 sums up the results of the previous Sections 5.1 to 5.3 by comparing the preferred 
specifications of the three different approaches. The first column (Column 2 from table 3) shows 
                                                          
30 The zero stage in the second part of table 2 is from now on always estimated with OLS and ideology included. 
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the results of the Random effects estimation (Section 5.1), according to which grants seem more 
effective than loans, but both are positive and statistically significant.31  
Table 6- Summary of the main results 
Identification strategy Random effects First differences Supply-side IV (2SLS) 
Original column (2) (2) (11) (3) (5) (9) 
VARIABLES GROWTH D. GROWTH D. GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
             
L.ODA_L 0.246** 0.346** 0.252 
 
0.393 0.146 
 
(0.115) (0.164) (0.194) 
 
(0.994) (2.588) 
L.ODA_L_2 -0.041* 0.025 0.068  0.770 
 
(0.023) (0.040) (0.082)   (0.506) 
L.ODA_G 0.337*** 0.711*** 0.485**  0.361 0.770 
 
(0.116) (0.161) (0.193)  (0.233) (0.506) 
L.ODA_G_2 -0.012** -0.026*** -0.017** 
  
 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
  
 
ODA_L    2.385  
    (1.873)   
ODA_G    0.881**   
    (0.346)   
LGDP 0.040 3.327***  1.874 0.845 -2.254 
 (0.263) (0.643)  (1.263) (0.972) (2.558) 
INF -0.388** -0.586** -0.673** -0.382 -0.480** -0.459** 
 
(0.196) (0.227) (0.265) (0.279) (0.201) (0.231) 
REVOL -0.613** -0.556 -0.624* -0.943* -0.775** -0.919** 
 
(0.270) (0.337) (0.345) (0.502) (0.302) (0.376) 
TRADE 0.061** 0.030 0.008 0.098* 0.037 0.012 
 
(0.030) (0.045) (0.044) (0.057) (0.027) (0.059) 
BUDG 0.011*** 0.019 0.013 0.003 0.016* 0.012 
 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) 
DEPTH -0.030*** -0.011 -0.009 -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.018 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.023) 
LEXP 6.980*** 2.078 3.871 8.011 3.621 -0.541 
 
(1.248) (2.511) (3.063) (5.133) (2.352) (5.097) 
L2.LGDP   -0.847    
   (0.701)    
       
      
 
Observations 539 406 378 517 517 514 
R-squared 0.260 0.254 0.222 -0.411 0.328 0.013 
Number of countries 115 97 97 96 96 96 
Instrumented variables - - - ODA ODA ODA, LGDP 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
However, their difference turns out to be statistically insignificant and the results are only 
unbiased under very strong and unreasonable assumptions, including zero correlation between the 
                                                          
31 Because both the linear and the quadratic term of grants are larger than their loan counterpart, the marginal effect 
of grant on growth is larger at zero and at any positive level of aid over GDP. 
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error term and any country-specific, time-varying and time-invariant effects.32 Columns 2 and 3, 
which show results from using the First-difference estimator (Section 5.2), eliminate the second 
of these two assumptions. For unbiasedness, it only has to be assumed that the error term is 
uncorrelated to unobserved time-varying country-specific effects. Under this weaker assumption, 
Column 2 still suggests that grants are more effective than loans in promoting growth. Relative to 
the previous column, the size of the aid coefficients increased rather strongly, and the difference 
between the two (more exactly the difference of the marginal effect when aid levels are zero) is 
now significant at the 5%-level. However, those results should not be trusted too much, even if 
there is no unobserved heterogeneity. The elimination of fixed effects by first-differencing 
removes one source of endogeneity bias by introducing another, namely the dynamic panel bias. 
In this case, where the bias stems from the LGDPit-1 control variable, it is very likely that this 
leads to an upward bias of the aid coefficients (see Roodman 2013). Column 3 shows a 
specification where this is accounted for by using a twice lagged version of LGDPit-1 as a proxy 
for its contemporaneous value. Under the main assumptions of serially uncorrelated errors and no 
unobserved heterogeneity, this could render consistent estimates of the aid coefficients. The grant 
coefficients remain significant (at the 5%-level) and the linear term reduces to a size which is 
more consistent with the previous results and those found in the literature. Loans become 
insignificant, the difference between the two linear terms becomes insignificant as well (F-test p-
value of 0.22), but the two are jointly significant at the 5%-level, and all four aid terms together 
are jointly significant as well (at the 10%-level).  
The last three columns of Table 6 show results of the supply-side instrumentation strategy 
using 2SLS (Section 5.3), which aimed to eliminate the last source of bias, the time varying 
unobserved heterogeneity, by instrumenting grants and loans with exogenous instruments taken 
at donor-level. Column 4 again shows the instrumented, contemporaneous grant coefficient to be 
significant at the 10%-level, while (instrumented contemporaneous) loans are insignificant. Both 
together are jointly significant at the 5%-level, but the difference between the two is not. The size 
of the grant coefficient is again rather large, implying that a one percentage point increase in the 
aid to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.88 percentage point increase of GDP growth within the 
                                                          
32 The first of these assumptions is slightly weakened by the introduction of a set of time-invariant controls in table 3, 
Column 4. In this case, the error term has to be only uncorrelated with unobserved time-invariant effects for 
unbiasedness. The coefficients of grant aid are very robust to this change. 
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same 5-year period.33 If lagged aid flows are used instead of contemporaneous ones, the 
coefficient of grants becomes insignificant (p-value = 0.12), although its size reduces to a more 
credible value, as can be seen in column 5. Coping with the dynamic panel bias, which is done in 
the last column by instrumenting LGDPit-1 with its lagged level, does not change the significance 
of the results, although it improves the quality of the instrumentation. 
 The conclusions of the main specifications seem ambiguous and reflect the difficulties 
inherent in any aid-growth regression. The efficient, but suspicious first-difference estimator 
found grant aid to be effective in the medium term, while the effect of loans was weaker or 
insignificant. The much more credible IV estimator based on supply-side instruments, which 
relies on relatively weak assumptions, found grants to be effective as well, but only in the short 
run. However, once the Dynamic Panel Bias was controlled for in the most rigorous 
specifications of this section, no significant effect of aid, whether as grants or as loans, could be 
identified for the short and medium term. Whether these results are robust or whether a different 
pattern emerges if the dependent variable, the estimator, or the instrumentation strategy are 
changed will be discussed in Section 6. 
6. Robustness tests 
This section briefly discusses whether the results obtained so far are robust to three kinds of 
changes, dealing with some major threats for the validity for the different identification strategies. 
First, it will be asked whether the results, that have been obtained by using only bilateral aid 
flows, can be generalized for multilateral aid as well, or whether they just show a local average 
treatment effect (LATE), which may not necessarily be policy relevant (Deaton (2010)). If the 
latter is true, then there is also the danger of omitted variable bias due to the exclusion of 
multilateral aid in the growth regression. Because available data for multilateral aid flows are not 
sufficiently detailed for the implementation of the supply-side IV strategy of Section 5.334, this 
first robustness test will be made using the first-difference approach of Section 5.2. A second 
robustness test addresses the concern of weak instrumentation, especially relevant for the results 
                                                          
33 While the coefficient of grants is relatively large, it is in a similar range as the one obtained with first-differences 
(same table, second column), suggesting that the inclusion of squared terms is not the main driver of the results (see 
Roodman (2008)). 
34 The multilateral aid flows have to be traced back to the original donor countries. These „imputed multilateral” aid 
flows have in fact been calculated by the OECD-DAC, but they do not make a distinction between grants and loans. 
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obtained in Section 5.3. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2004) 
show that GMM based estimators (such as the “Continuously Updated GMM estimator” (CUE)) 
and so-called “k-class” IV estimators, such as the “Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
estimator” (LIML) and the Fuller (1970) estimator outperform 2SLS in the presence of weak 
instruments, especially with smaller samples.35 Finally, a third robustness test will address the 
problem of Dynamic Panel Bias, which plagues the results of both Section 5.2 and 5.3, in a more 
sophisticated manner. More specifically, the “Difference-GMM” (Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
the “System-GMM” (Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)) estimators will be 
used to account for the endogeneity of the two disaggregated aid variables (loans and grants) as 
well as endogeneity in the LGDPit-1 control variable, and to test for serial correlation of the 
residuals, which is crucial for unbiasedness. 
Testing for omitted variable bias: Bilateral versus multilateral aid 
Table 7 compares the results of selected specifications from Section 2 (Table 4), which used only 
bilateral aid flows, to the same specifications when multilateral aid flows are added. The overall 
pattern of the aid variables seems fairly similar, almost all of them retain their sign, most of them 
have the same significance level and the size of the coefficients is roughly the same. An 
exception is the linear grant coefficient, which is somewhat smaller when multilateral grants are 
included. For this reason, if it seems inadequate to generalize the results of Section 5.2 to the 
level of aggregated aid flows (bilateral and multilateral), at least with regard to the coefficient 
sizes. With respect to the mere significance of grants and loans, a generalization seems possible 
and omitted variable bias does not seem to be a major concern for the results obtained in Section 
5, although one has to remain cautious. 36 To be conservative, perhaps the results should still only 
be interpreted as LATEs, as they are not perfectly robust to the inclusion of multilateral aid. 
                                                          
35 The CUE estimator goes back to Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996), while the LIML estimator has already been 
derived by Anderson and Rubin (1949). Strictly speaking, 2SLS IV and OLS are also k-class estimators with k=1 or 
k=0 respectively. A very insightful summary of k-class estimators is given in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007, 
ch.4). 
36 In addition to the results shown here, all of the equations in Section 5.1 (Random effects) and 5.2 (First 
differences) have been rerun with a) multilateral aid flows only and b) multilateral grants and loans and their squared 
terms  added as additional regressors and estimated in one regression with the bilateral flows. In the first case, the 
coefficients of the multilateral aid variables were similar to those of the bilateral ones in the RE models, but lost their 
significance in most of the first-difference specifications. In the second case, the bilateral aid coefficients hardly 
changed, and all of the multilateral coefficients were highly insignificant individually, and jointly insignificant at 
conventional significance levels as well. Thus, the possibility of omitted variable bias due to the exclusion of 
multilateral aid can be rather confidently rejected. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 7 – Bilateral versus total aid  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES D.GROWTH D. GROWTH D. GROWTH D. GROWTH D. GROWTH D. GROWTH 
              
a) Bilateral aid flows only       
LD.ODA_L 0.346** 0.312** 0.158 -0.257 -0.090 0.303* 
 
(0.164) (0.155) (0.111) (0.443) (0.505) (0.156) 
LD.ODA_L_2 0.025 0.048 0.036 0.335** 0.249 0.047 
 
(0.040) (0.035) (0.032) (0.147) (0.204) (0.036) 
LD.ODA_G 0.711*** 0.536*** -0.002 -1.002 -0.528 0.588*** 
 
(0.161) (0.159) (0.113) (0.632) (1.077) (0.157) 
LD.ODA_G_2 -0.026*** -0.020*** 0.002 0.030 0.015 -0.022*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.021) (0.036) (0.006) 
       
b) Bilateral + multilateral aid 
flows 
      
      
LD.MULTI_L 0.369** 0.300* 0.097 -0.342 -0.130 0.317* 
 (0.159) (0.162) (0.099) (0.483) (0.548) (0.162) 
LD.MULTI_L_2 -0.033*** -0.025** -0.009 0.048 0.024 -0.027** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.051) (0.057) (0.011) 
LD.MULTI_G 0.403*** 0.320** 0.003 -0.251 -0.055 0.355*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.092) (0.401) (0.472) (0.135) 
LD.MULTI_G_2 -0.009* -0.008 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.008 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) 
Estimator FD FD FD A-H (diff.) A-H (level) FD 
LGDP First difference Level 
Lagged first 
difference 
First difference First difference dropped 
Respective column in Table 4 2 5 8 14 16 17 
Observations 406 406 406 406 406 406 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, FD refers to the first  difference estimator 
(estimated with OLS), A-H is the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (estimated with 2SLS), controls are the same as in Table 
XXX and are not shown here 
  
Better inference with weak instruments:  GMM-based IV estimators 
Table 8 tests the robustness of the results obtained in Section 5.3 by using two different GMM-
based k-class estimators instead of the simple 2SLS estimator to re-estimate some of the most 
rigorous specifications of the supply-side IV approach. More specifically, the Columns 9, 10 and 
11 (Table 5), which all used lagged aid flows and instrumented grants, loans and LGDP, are 
estimated again, this time using the CUE-GMM estimator and the Fuller k-class estimator (with 
α=1, following Fuller (1977)), both of which have been shown to perform better than 2SLS in 
finite samples and with the presence of weak instruments (Hahn et al. (2004)).  
42 
 
Table 8 – k-class estimators and continuously updated GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Corresponding column in 
Table 5 
9 9 9 9 9 10 11 
VARIABLES GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH  
ESTIMATOR CUE-GMM Fuller (1) CUE-GMM Fuller( 1) Fuller (1) Fuller (1) Fuller (1) 
                
L.ODA_L 0.146 0.177 0.146 0.177 0.177 2.667 
 
 
(1.285) (1.220) (1.320) (1.198) (2.400) (3.693) 
 L.ODA_G 0.770** 0.748** 0.770** 0.748** 0.748† 0.948* 
 
 
(0.334) (0.323) (0.350) (0.330) (0.473) (0.511) 
 LGDP -2.254 -2.334 -2.254 -2.334 -2.334 -1.803 -0.028 
 
(1.899) (1.841) (1.975) (1.872) (2.401) (3.177) (0.022) 
L.log_ODA_L 
      
0.140 
       
(2.152) 
L.log_ODA_G
      
0.707† 
       
(0.445) 
        Observations 514 514 514 514 514 484 514 
R-squared 0.013 0.028 0.013 0.028 0.028 -0.493 0.083 
Number of countries 96 96 96 96 96 92 96 
AP F-stat: Loans 8.49 8.49 8.62 8.62 9.29 4.86 7.42 
AP F-stat: Grants 16.27 16.27 14.61 14.61 19.87 13.45 17.35 
AP F-stat: log(GDP) 95.88 95.88 102.60 102.60 72.22 32.51 78.58 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 2.830 2.830 2.863 2.863 3.945 2.467 2.723 
KP LM Stat (p-value) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.017 0.004 
Standard errors robust to: - - AC AC HAC(cluster) HAC(cluster) HAC(cluster) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.12, LGDP is instrumented by its lagged value 
(and additionally by its second lag in col.6), (lagged) oda_l and (lagged) oda_g are instrumented by their respective 
(lagged) predicted values from the zero stage, CUE-GMM refers to the Continuously updated GMM estimator, 
Fuller (1) is the Fuller (1977) k-class estimator with alpha=1, both are implemented with the panel data fixed effects 
estimator, AC-autocorrelation, HAC(cluster)- arbitrary heteroscedasticity and clustering on country 
 
The first two columns of Table 8 show the results of a re-estimation of column 9 (Table 4), when 
spherical disturbances (homoscedasticy and nonautocorrelation) are assumed. In this case, the 
coefficient of grant aid becomes significant at the 5%-level, contrary to the 2SLS estimation in 
Section 5.3, where it was insignificant even at the 10% level. The coefficient size is higher than 
what is usually found in the literature, but that a 1 percentage point increase in Aid/GDP would 
be associated with a 0.7 to 0.8 increase in growth in the following 5-year period seems not 
completely unreasonable. Comparing columns 1 and 2, it seems that the choice between the 
CUE-GMM and the Fuller (1) estimator does not matter much, as the results are very similar. The 
results in columns 3 and 4, which use standard errors robust to arbitrary autocorrelation for 
inference (and thus “only” need to assume homoscedasticity for unbiasedness) support this 
43 
 
conclusion, which is why the CUE-GMM estimator will be dropped from here on. The switch to 
autocorrelation-robust errors slightly increases standard errors for the grant and loan coefficients, 
but grants remain significant at the 5%-level. When the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
relaxed in column 5, and accordingly standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity (accross 
countries)  and arbitrary autocorrelation are used, grants become only “marginally significant” (p-
value = 0.116). The grant coefficient regains significance at the 10%-level, when an additional 
second lag of LGDP is used as an instrument in column 6, in an attempt to further improve 
instrumentation. In particular, because the number of instruments now exceeds the number of 
instrumented variables, it becomes possible to run a Sargan-Hansen-test for overidentifying 
restrictions, which fails to reject the null-hypothesis (“no overidentifying restrictions”) at 
comfortable significance levels (p-value= 0.2914). However, besides this, it seems that the 
quality of instrumentation actually decreased relative to the exactly identified case, as can be seen 
by lower first-stage F-statistics and a lower Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the reduced form 
regression. Thus, the high and significant grant coefficient should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, column 7 re-estimates column 11 from Table 4. To account for the possibility of 
decreasing marginal returns to aid and avoid misspecification bias, logarithmic transformations of 
the Aid/GDP ratios have been introduced. The grant coefficient becomes marginally significant 
(p-value=0.114). Due to the log-transformation, the presumed marginal effect on growth is now 
non-linear. At the average Grant Aid/GDP ratio of the respective sample (roughly 2.7 %), a one 
percentage point increase of Grants/GDP is associated with a 0.23 percentage point increase in 
growth. This is remarkably close to values found in the literature for total aid (e.g. Clemens et al. 
2012, Hansen and Tarp (2001)), and it shows that the results of Section 3.2 are reasonably robust 
to and can even be improved upon by the choice of the estimator.37 
Correcting the dynamic panel bias: “Difference”- and “System”- GMM 
In a final robustness test, the problem of endogeneity due to the Dynamic Panel Bias, which is 
only superficially addressed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, will be analyzed more rigorously. For this 
purpose,” Difference”- and “System”- GMM estimators are used, which enable us to instrument 
                                                          
37 An improvement which has not been shown here is that the switch from simple 2SLS to CUE-GMM or the Fuller 
k-class estimator increases the robustness of the first stage regressions, which could for example be seen by the 
reduction of the critical values of the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instruments test (Baum, Schaffer and Stilman 
(2007, p.13)). In this case however, those critical values are not shown because they are only computed for non-
robust standard errors and a maximum of two endogenous regressors. 
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potentially endogenous variables by a set of their own lags and differences. However, the use of 
those estimators has been criticized as they are vulnerable to endogeneity bias, especially if 
samples are small and instruments are weak, (Roodman (2009a, 2009b), Bazzi and Clemens 
(2013)). Nevertheless, Table 9 shows the results of different GMM specifications, using the same 
basic set of time-varying controls as in Section 5.  
Table 9 – Difference and System GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
Estimator Diff.-GMM Diff.-GMM Diff.-GMM Diff.-GMM Diff.-GMM Sys.-GMM 
              
L.ODA_L -0.166 -0.444 -0.582 -0.231  0.147 
 
(0.286) (0.291) (0.522) (0.265)  (0.458) 
L.ODA_G 0.242** 0.178* 0.248** 0.571*  0.076 
 
(0.119) (0.104) (0.115) (0.289)  (0.092) 
L.ODA_L_2 
   
-0.032  
 
    
(0.092)  
 L.ODA_G_2 
   
-0.019*  
 
    
(0.010)  
 LGDP -4.399*** -1.456 -3.394 0.725 -0.033 -0.108 
 
(1.472) (1.474) (2.355) (2.176) (0.024) (0.567) 
L.log_ODA_L 
    
-0.486 
 
     
(0.739) 
 L.log_ODA_G 
    
0.238* 
 
     
(0.135) 
 
     
 
 Observations 430 430 430 430 430 411 
F-stat 6.84 5.19 10.95 39.96 8.91 9.10 
Number of country 98 98 98 98 98 97 
Number of Instruments 100 92 78 112 113 111 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.096 0.057 0.045 0.030 0.041 0.035 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.240 0.597 0.225 0.923 0.188 0.909 
Hansen-test (p-value) 0.539 0.419 0.592 0.884 0.367 0.726 
Sargan-test (p-value) 0.255 0.959 1.000 0.928 0.999 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; L- laged value; (1) treats LGDP as 
predetermined, (2) treats LGDP as endogenous, (3) uses only third lag and deeper as GMM-style IVs 
  
Column 1, which uses “Difference”-GMM, treats all but one of those regressors as strictly 
exogenous (uncorrelated with future, present and past error terms) and thus uses all their lagged 
levels (starting at the current period t) as IV-style instruments for themselves. The one exception 
is LGDPit-1, which is assumed to be predetermined (uncorrelated with future and current, but 
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potentially correlated with past error terms).38 The aid variables are assumed to be endogenous, 
because they are most likely correlated with current error term as well. Hence, only their twice-
lagged levels and deeper lags can be used as instruments. 
As can be seen in Column 1, this specification returns a grant coefficient which is 
significant at the 5%-level and has a reasonable size. Loans are negative, but highly insignificant. 
The Anderson-Bond test for autocorrelation of the differenced residuals shows, as expected, 
negative serial correlation of order one. However, at least at the 10%-level, we can also reject the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of order two (p-value = 0.096<0.1). Second-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals, which translates to first-order autocorrelation in 
levels, means that the twice lagged levels of the endogenous variables and the once-lagged level 
of the predetermined variables are potentially endogenous and cannot be used as instruments. 
Column 2 shows thus the same specification which now assumes LGDP to be endogenous as 
well, allowing only its twice-lagged level as an instrument. The grant coefficient becomes smaller 
but remains significant on the 10% level. However, the problem of second order autocorrelation 
actually increased relative to Column 1. Thus, in Column 3 only lags 3 and deeper lags of the aid 
variables are used as instruments, which would be still exogenous with second order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals.39 Because there is no third-order serial correlation (p-
value = 0.22) and both overidentifying restriction tests (the Hansen and the Sargan test) cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, the estimation in Column 3 seems consistent. The grant coefficient is 
positive, significant at the 5%-level and has a reasonable size. Column 4 introduces squared 
terms, and restricts both the predetermined and the endogenous variables to be instrumented from 
the third lag onwards. As it could be expected when the true relationship between grants and 
growth is concave, introduction of the squared term (which is negative and significant) increases 
the coefficient of the linear term, which remains significant at the 10%-level. The difference 
between grants and loans is statistically significant at the 1%-level. As in the previous columns, 
there is no evidence of third-order autocorrelation.  
                                                          
38 The first difference of LGDP, which is a regressor in the difference equation, is the growth rate from the first year 
of the last period to the first year of the current period and thus practically a lagged dependent variable. It is 
obviously correlated with error term in the difference equation, where the dependent variable is the difference of 
growth rates between t-1 and t. Hence, only the once lagged level (which is the growth rate from t-2 to t-1) and 
deeper lags can be used as exogenous instruments for predetermined variables (Roodman 2009a, p.13).  
39 For the endogenous aid terms, which enter already lagged into the difference equation, the number of lags is 
always reported relative to their initial lag. Hence, lag 3 refers to period t-4. 
46 
 
As another way of allowing for a non-linear effect of aid, Column 5 re-estimates Column 3 using 
the logarithmic transformations of the aid variables. The specification seems to give good results, 
including a rejection of third-order autocorrelation. Grant aid is significant at the 10%-level, but 
the marginal effect on growth is rather small. A one-percentage point increase at the sample mean 
is associated with a 0.09 percentage point increase in growth. Column 6 finally introduces the 
“System”-GMM estimator, which adds moment equations in levels to the “Difference” estimator 
and instruments them with differences. “System”-GMM is expected to improve upon 
“Difference”-GMM if lagged levels are bad predictors of current differences, for example if the 
dependent variable is close to a random walk. Even though this is rather unlikely in the present 
case, for the sake of completeness column 6 still reports the results of “System”-GMM for the 
specification of Column 3. The grant coefficient becomes insignificant and the Sargan-test, which 
is not weakened by many instruments, shows that there are overidentifying restrictions biasing 
the results. Nevertheless, the results using the “Difference”-GMM estimator were promising and 
make it more likely that the positive effect of grant aid on growth, identified in most of the 
specifications in this paper, is not a mere reflection of Dynamic Panel Bias or other types of 
endogeneity. 
7. Conclusion 
This study extends the aid-growth literature by analyzing the effect of foreign aid, disaggregated 
into bilateral grants and loans, on growth. The endogeneity of aid is taken into account and 
several distinct instrumentation strategies are employed in order to obtain meaningful and 
consistent estimates, while additional attention has been paid to the identification problems 
stemming from weak instrumentation and multicollinearity in the presence of multiple 
endogenous regressors.  The results have been mixed. It has become apparent that none of the 
identification strategies developed so far is designed to work robustly in the case of multiple 
endogenous variables. This makes it particularly difficult to identify a differential effect between 
two collinear regressors and leads to “jumping” coefficients that frequently change size or sign. 
Accordingly, this study failed to clearly identify a significantly different effect of loans and grants 
on growth, notwithstanding the theoretical arguments that such an effect might actually exist.  
However, during the systematic application of different instrumentation strategies on the same 
sample with the same set of control variables, an interesting pattern evolved. The most basic 
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identification strategies showed positive correlations between growth both grant aid and loan aid. 
Once the endogeneity bias was accounted for, loans became insignificant. Grants however were 
consistently, albeit weakly, associated with growth in the majority of specifications. The 
estimated marginal effect was in most cases larger than previous estimates, found in the literature 
for aggregated aid. This is consistent with intuition, because the marginal effect of aggregated aid 
is a weighted average of the effects of its disaggregated components. It could also reflect the fact 
that disaggregating aid into its bilateral grant and loan components reduces noise in the data, 
which makes it more likely to identify a significant effect at least for some of the components. 
But non-significance of loans does not necessarily mean that loans are ineffective in promoting 
growth. It might also reflect weak instrumentation, which I was not be able to eliminate 
completely. Nevertheless, the mostly positive, marginally significant effect of bilateral grants on 
growth was confirmed by various robustness tests, and the results for multilateral aid have been 
very similar to those for bilateral aid. 
However, several caveats apply. Even though different identification strategies have been 
used, the results should still be interpreted only as local average treatment effects, because in the 
most rigorous specifications, only bilateral aid flows could be used. Furthermore, the general 
pattern of the results seems consistent, but they have proven to be sensitive to specification 
changes nevertheless. Especially the treatment of the Dynamic Panel bias seems to be a crucial 
point. The more rigorous it is accounted for, the less strong are the results, which should prevent 
us from interpreting them as a clear causal relationship. Further research on the link between aid 
and growth should focus on the treatment of Dynamic Panel bias, if good quasi-experiments are 
not available for the specific research question that is to be addressed. The use of even more 
disaggregated aid data, such as geo-localized project aid, seems to provide another promising 
opportunity for further research. 
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Appendix 
Table A – Variable definition and sources 
   
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
   
GROWTH Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita  World Development 
Indicators (WDI) (2015) 
ODA_G Official development assistance, disbursed, 
bilateral grants, as % of GDP 
OECD- Development 
assistance committee (DAC) 
ODA_L Official development assistance, disbursed, 
bilateral net loans, as % of GDP 
OECD-DAC 
LGDP Logarithm of initial GDP per capita, in 2005 
USD 
WDI (2015) 
INF Logarithm of (1+ annual CPI inflation rate ) WDI (2015) 
DEPTH Lagged value of money and quasi-money 
(M2) as % of GDP  
WDI (2015) 
REVO Average number of revolutions (including 
failed attempts) 
Arthur S. Banks (2007) 
TRADE Exports + Imports (goods and services) as % 
of GDP 
WDI (2015) 
BUDG Overall Government Budget Balance as % 
of GDP (Cash surplus as % of GDP if 
budget balance is missing) 
WDI (2015) 
LEXP Logarithm of Life expectancy at birth (in 
years) 
WDI (2015) 
GEOGRAPHY  Time invariant composite measure Originally Bosworth and 
Collins (2004), obtained via 
Clemens et al (2012) 
ICRG Composite indicator of Quality of 
Government 
Institutional country risk 
guide (2013) 
ETHN Ethnic fracionalization index, time invariant Obtained from Romain 
Wazciarg’s homepage 
SSA, EAS Dummy for Sub-Sahara Africa and East 
Asia 
 
IDEOLOGY Ideological orientation of main execute 
party, 1=rightwing, 2=centrist, 3=leftwing 
Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001) 
MULTI_G Official development assistance, disbursed, 
bilateral and multilateral grants, as % of 
GDP 
OECD-DAC 
MULTI-L Official development assistance, disbursed, 
bilateral and multilateral net loans, as % of 
GDP 
OECD-DAC 
 
